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INTRODUCTION
Suspicions over pharmaceutical ethics in an exclusively profit based industry have
surfaced once again. This time is the victim Merck & Co., Inc. (“Merck”) or is it the twenty
million Americans who filled their prescriptions for Vioxx? Plaintiff attorney Mark Lainer’s
opening statement, in the first publicized trial in Brazoria County Texas state court, described the
company’s drug safety policy as “Murky Ethics.” The thousands of personal injury cases filed
after Merck’s voluntary withdrawal of Vioxx appear difficult to prove. A large obstacle for
plaintiffs is the admissibility of epidemiologic studies, which are required to prove specific
causation. Despite considerable obstacles, the sex appeal of these cases is too enticing for the
litigation savvy. If plaintiffs can at least get the case to make it to a jury, then the odds are that
some will be successful with likely large awards, possibly including punitive damages.
Pharmaceutical companies spend countless hours and resources developing and
researching new drugs. While considering America’s health concerns, companies direct most of
their attention towards medical problems that have a greater population to market to, or most
importantly, ones that will generate the most revenue. Once a drug is initially developed and the
corporation believes it to be a profitable venture, trials of drugs begin in the lab and then
clinically in order to gain regulatory approval.3 In order for a drug to be approved for sale in the
U.S. the drugs must endure the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) three-step approval
process.4

3

Food and Drug Administration, The New Drug Approval Process: Steps from Test Tube to New Application
Review, available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/handbook/develop.htm (last visited Dec. 12, 2005). This clickable
diagram explains the process each drug endures in the approval process.
4
Id.
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FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION
The FDAfalls under the direction of the Department of Health and Human Services.
Overly simplified, the FDA process is one comparing the risks and side effects of a drug to the
benefit one receives from taking it. In making these decisions, the FDA takes into account the
significance of a targeted health condition, or the status of that condition as a treatable disease.5
If a product has not received marketing approval (or an exemption) from the agency, then the
drug cannot be sold. Even if a company has surmounted the often difficult hurdle of proving that
a product serves a therapeutic purpose without posing an undue risk, the FDA’s decisions about
appropriate labeling may affect how readily patients will be able to use it.6
On average, the estimated cost from design to approval in 2000 dollars is $802 million.7
The expected cost of developing the average HIV/AIDS drug is $479 million; however, the
expected cost of developing the average rheumatoid arthritis drug is close to double at $936
million.8 The difference in cost is attributable to the necessity and speed that AIDS drugs need
to get to otherwise terminally ill patients.

DIRECT TO CONSUMER MARKETING
Historically, pharmaceutical companies developed and directed their entire product
marketing, promotion, and education to physicians and health care providers responsible for
prescribing the manufacturer’s products. 9 Realizing the profit potential, drug companies now

5

Noah Lars, Challenges in the Federal Regulation of Pain Management Technologies, 31 J. L. Med. & Ethics 55
(Spring 2003).
6
Id.
7
Christopher Adams, Estimating the Costs of New Drug Development: Is it really $802m? (Dec. 2004), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=640563#PaperDownload.
8
Id.
9
Elizabeth Powell-Bullock, Gaming the Hatch-Waxman System: How Pioneer Drug Makers Exploit the Law to
Maintain Monopoly Power in the Prescription Drug Market, 29 J. Legis. 21, 40 (2002).
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provide direct-to-consumer advertising to the public in an effort to increase profits and market
share.10
Upjohn Co. became the first drug manufacturer to advertise directly to consumers when it
advertised for Rogaine, a hair-loss treatment.11 From 1995 to 1996 drug companies increased
advertising directed to consumers by ninety percent. 12 Many ads aimed at consumers were
lacking in some manner and did not give the consumer sufficient understanding of the associated
risks of using the drug.13 The massive direct advertising campaign continued in the early 1990’s,
with marketing directed towards women, instead of their doctors, concerning the Norplant™
birth control system.14 These recent developments have provoked FDA response.
Merck is one of the five largest pharmaceutical companies in the world.15 Company sales
totaled nearly $23 billion in 2003.16 Vioxx was heavily marketed in the U.S. and 80 countries
worldwide.17 The company spent over $100 million annually in direct-to-consumer advertising
on Vioxx alone.18 The drug became an instant blockbuster with physicians writing over one
hundred million prescriptions, twenty million users, and raking in roughly $2.5 billion in
Merck’s annual sales.19

10

Id.
Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories Inc., 734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. 1999) citing Jon D. Hanson and Douglas A. Kysar, Taking
Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Marketing Manipulation, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1420, 1456 (1999).
12
Id.
13
Hanson, supra note 11.
14
In Re Norplant Contraceptive Products Liability Litigation, 215 F. Supp. 2d 795 (D.C.E.D. Tex. 2002).
15
Prescription For Trouble, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 14, 2004 available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/11/14/60minutes/main655577.shtml.
16
Id.
17
Merck & Co. Inc., Merck Announces Voluntary Worldwide Withdrawal of VIOXX (Sept 30, 2004), available at
http://www.vioxx.com/vioxx/documents/english/vioxx_press_release.pdf.
18
Eric J. Topol, Good Riddance to a Bad Drug, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2004, at A15.
19
Dustin R. Marlowe, Note: A dose of reality for §6(c) of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 39
Ga. L. Rev. 1445 (Summer, 2005).
11

5

Merck’s success with Vioxx paralleled Pfizer’s COX-II inhibitors, Celebrex and Bextra.20
The success of all three drugs was attributable to their apparent ability to satisfy the best of both
possible worlds, relieving pain without provoking the risk of stomach or intestinal bleeding
inherent to ibuprofen and similar drugs.21 The cost of a COX-II specific drug is far greater than
original non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (“NSAIDs”) such as aspirin.22 Vioxx costs a few
dollars a day while aspirin is only a few pennies.23 Vioxx was not intended to be taken as often
(once a day) compared to other NSAIDs (two or more times a day);24 so while Vioxx is more
convenient the greater cost may outweigh the convenience of the dosage.

WHAT IS VIOXX?
Rofecoxib (“Vioxx”) received FDA approval in 1999 for sale in the U.S.25 The drug’s
intended uses at the time of approval was for reduction of pain and inflammation caused by
osteoarthritis, acute pain, and menstrual pain.26 The drug was subsequently approved to treat
rheumatoid arthritis in adults and children. 27 Rheumatoid arthritis is a chronic syndrome
characterized by inflammation in the lining of the joints, causing pain, stiffness, warmth, redness,

20

Aaron Smith, ‘Me-too’ drugs can rake in sales: Copycats like Lipitor can make billions, or fail like Vioxx and
Bextra. CNN (July, 28, 2005), available at http://money.cnn.com/2005/07/27/news/fortune500/metoo/index.htm;
See also, Richard A. Epstein, Pharmaceutical Innovation and Cost: An American Dilemma: Regulatory Paternalism
in the Market for Drugs: Lessons from Vioxx and Celebrex, 5 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 741, 742 (Summer,
2005).
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id. The original NSAIDs are not isoform specific and inhibit both COX enzymes which is later explained in
greater detail. Some examples include aspirin (Bayer), naproxen (Aleve), and ibuprofen (Advil). To date many
(including those listed) of the original NSAIDs are over-the-counter medications (“OTC”) which do not require the
prescription. All COX-II selective drugs are only obtainable by prescription.
24
Id.
25
Prescription for Trouble, supra note 15.
26
Marlowe, supra note 19.
27
Id.
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and swelling, leading to pain and loss of movement. 28 Osteoarthritis, or degenerative joint
disease, is characterized by the breakdown of the cartilage that cushions the ends of bones.29 The
cartilage breakdown at the joints causes the bones to rub against each other, leading to pain and
loss of movement.30
Vioxx is in a class of drugs called NSAIDs. 31 NSAIDs represent peripherally acting
analgesics.32 They work by blocking the production of prostaglandins, which are hormone-like
chemicals that are released in the body in response to injury.33 The prostaglandins are what
cause inflammation, redness, swelling, pain, and fever.34 Reducing the amount of prostaglandins
reduces inflammation and its symptoms.35 In order to inhibit production of prostaglandins, the
NSAIDs act by blocking the enzyme cyclooxygenase (“COX”).36 After further study scientists
discovered that the COX enzyme has two isoforms, one associated with inflammation (COX-II)
and another thought to protect the lining of the stomach (COX-I).37 Older NSAIDs blocked both
isoforms, which may explain their connection to development of ulcers.38
Like other drugs in the same class as Vioxx, the COX-II designation was believed to
signify a welcomed measure of specificity. Drugs in this class could work effectively in pain
management while being friendlier on the stomach than original NSAIDs.

28

Randall W. King and Richard Worthington, Arthritis, Rheumatoid (last modified April 8, 2005), available at
http://www.emedicine.com/emerg/topic48.htm.
29
Gregory Stacy and Auveek Pat Basu, Osteoarthritis, Primary (last modified Nov. 4, 2005), available at
http://www.emedicine.com/radio/topic492.htm.
30
Id.
31
Lars, supra note 5.
32
Analgesics relieve pain without causing the loss of consciousness.
33
Lars, supra note 5.
34
Id.
35
Corinne de Vires, Cox-II inhibitors versus non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs in rheumatoid and osteoarthritis
patients: gastrointestinal effects. STEER 2002; Vol. 2: No. 8 (2001), available at
http://www.wihrd.soton.ac.uk/projx/signpost/steers/STEER_2002(8).pdf.Steer.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Lars, supra note 5; Inhibiting COX-I is thought to inhibit the production of mucosa of the inner lining of the
stomach and therefore leaves the lining unprotected from irritation leading to ulcers.
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WHAT HAPPENED?
Clinical research began to indicate that there may be an increase in adverse
cardiovascular (“CV”) side effects associated with Vioxx. In February 1997, top company
scientist, Alise Reicin, wrote an internal email that read “the possibility of increased CV events
is of great concern.”39 She also wrote that the concern of these results may “kill” the drug.40
Company employees and their consultants published several papers in medical journals rebutting
studies reporting Vioxx’s heart attack risk. Merck dismissed these studies, citing poor clinical
study design and inadequate data. However, Merck did not engage in research to rebut the
allegations.
In February 2001, the FDA consulted its Arthritis Advisory Committee regarding the
clinical interpretation and found COX-II inhibitors potentially have a beneficial antiatherogenic41 effect by reducing inflammation. Inflammation is also an important contributor to
heart attacks and strokes.
On September 17, 2001, the director of the FDA Division of Drug Marketing,
Advertising, and Communications, issued a “Warning Letter” to the President and CEO of
Merck relating to promotional activities and materials for the marketing of Vioxx.42 The letter
stated that Merck’s promotional campaign discounted the facts of an epidemiological study
(VIGOR). The results of this study showed a correlation between patients taking Vioxx and a
four to five fold increase in myocardial infarctions43 compared to patients taking naproxen.44 A

39

Heather Tosoriero, et. al., Merck Loss Jolts Drug Giant, Industry, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 2005, at A1.
Anna Mathews and Scott Hensley, Medical Journal Says Merck Study Omitted Data, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 2005,
at A6.
41
Anti-atherogenic properties help to prevent formation of plaques in the arteries.
42
Thomas W. Abrams, Warning Letter, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION (Sept. 17, 2005), available at
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/mass-tort/forms/vioxx_longform_exhibb_111303.pdf.
43
Acute myocardial infarction (AMI) is the rapid development of myocardial necrosis (death of heart muscle tissue)
caused by a critical imbalance between the oxygen supply and demand of the myocardium. More information
available at http://www.emedicine.com/EMERG/topic327.htm.
40
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few months later Merck changed product labeling to include the results of this study. However,
Merck had such confidence in the ability of Vioxx that the company sought to expand the
portfolio of permissible uses by raising the dosage to determine the effectiveness of Vioxx in
treating polyps. 45 During this trial Merck discovered an apparent increase in the number of
adverse CV occurrences.46
On September 30, 2004, Merck announced that it would voluntarily pull Vioxx from the
market. Withdrawal occurred before FDA demand. The decision to remove the drug from the
market was widely read as a fatal admission of dangerous conduct by a company that should
never have launched the drug in the first place. The veritable firestorm of reactions included the
anticipated onslaught of ordinary tort actions for personal injuries, congressional investigations,
inquiries by the SEC, derivative actions, suits for refunds, internal inquiries and so forth. 47
Merck’s shares lost $12 from $45.07 to $33 the day it announced Vioxx’s removal, only to
stabilize in the $29-$33 range thereafter.48 On November 2, 2004, Merck’s stock tumbled 10%
after the media reported that the company hid data regarding Vioxx from the FDA.49
On a larger scale, one wonders if the drug industry’s tolerance for incomplete data is
reflective of an industry preference for marketing drugs based on profitability rather than effects.
Would the drug companies be so tolerant of incomplete financial data on their drugs?

Fingers

are being pointed everywhere, hoping to find someone to blame. Dr. David Graham, an FDA
scientist, put the blame on the FDA saying the agency overvalues the benefits of the drugs it

44

Debabrata Mukherjee, et. al., Risk of Cardiovascular Events Associated With Selective Cox-2 Inhibitors, J.A.M.A.
286:8, 954-959, (Aug. 22, 2001). See also, Abrams, supra note 41.
45
Polyps are intestinal growths that may become cancerous.
46
Robert Bresalier, Cardiovascular Events with Rofecoxib in Colorectal Adenoma Chemoprevention Trial, NEJM
(March 17, 2005), Issue 352, 1092-1102. See also, Epstein, supra note 20, at 742.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
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approves and seriously undervalues drug safety.50 As the CV side effects became increasingly
apparent, Merck and the FDA engaged in a tug of war over the label’s language.
On December 17, 2004 Pfizer announced that one of two clinical studies on Celebrex,
another COX-II, revealed that it presented an elevated risk of heart attacks.51 There is a strong
suspicion as more research is completed that the cardiac events may affect the entire class of
COX-II drugs.52 In 2002, Merck withdrew its FDA application for another COX-II drug the
company was developing called Arcoxia. 53 This represented Merck’s first application removal
in ten years.54 Pfizer has not removed Celebrex from the market, but has since stopped consumer
advertising.55
On February 18, 2005, the FDA created an advisory panel to look into concerns related to
Vioxx. The panel recommended allowing doctors to prescribe Vioxx provided the product came
with a strong warning for special need cases. 56 The panel decided that the arthritis drugs’
benefits outweighed the risks of heart problems and strokes but suggested the products carry
strong warnings. The FDA is not bound by the panel’s findings. At this point Merck has not
lobbied the FDA to return the drug to market. Physicians have attempted to explain why there

50

See, Philip J. Hilts, PROTECTING AMERICA’S HEALTH: THE FDA; BUSINESS; AND 100 YEARS OF REGULATION.
(2003).
51
FE Silverstein, et. al., Gastrointestinal toxicity with celcoxib vs nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs for
osteoarthritis and rheumatoid arthritis: the CLASS study: A randomized controlled trial. Celecoxib Long-term
Arthritis Safety Study, JAMA (2000), Vol. 284, Issue 10, 1247-55.
52
Andrew Pollack, New Scrutiny of Drugs in Vioxx’s Family, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2004, at C1; Rod Winslow, Heart
Risk Is Seen In Class of Drugs For a Host of Ills, WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 2005, at B4.
53
Forbes, Bad News: Merck Withdraws Arcoxia Application (March 15, 2005), available at
www.forbes.com/2002/03/15/0315mrk.html; see also, In re Merck & Co., Inc., 150 S.W.3d 747 (Tex. App. 2004).
54
Id.
55
Amy Tsao. Big Changes for Big Pharma (January 3, 2005). available at
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/jan2005/nf2005013_7406_db037.htm; see also, Epstein, supra note
20.
56
The strongest warning, as here, called a “Black Box Warning,” which is of certain size located on the front of the
box visible to all users that addresses a specific warning.

10

may be an increased CV risk with Vioxx.57 The role of COX enzymes in the body is clearly not
fully understood and there is evidence that COX-I has thrombotic effects (helps promote blood
clotting). Blocking COX-II and not COX-I could tip the balance in favor of clotting.58
On March 1, 2005 the FDA, in response to overwhelming criticism, lobbied congress to
be empowered to write warning labels for drugs.59 This caused a revisit to how the FDA should
proceed on matters of withdrawal and recall. Some observers have criticized the agency for
approving too many new NSAIDs that offer no particular advantage over existing, and typically
less expensive drugs in the class. 60

The FDA usually does not make judgments about

comparative efficacy, preferring to leave that task for physicians and patients based on the
information supplied in the labeling dictated by agency reviewers.61 On November 9, 2005, the
FDA made a recommendation that all COX-II drugs carry a boxed warning highlighting GI and
CV risks.62
On December 8, 2005, the New England Journal of Medicine released an editorial,
published in the December 29th edition, stating that editors have uncovered what is believed to be
publishing misconduct.63 Editors allege that authors of the VIGOR study failed to publish the
complete findings of patients having adverse CV outcomes. 64

An editor, preparing for

57
Yang Chen, et. al., Role of Prostacyclin in the Cardiovascular Response to Thromboxane A2, Journal of Science,
Vol. 296, pp. 539-541 (Apr. 19, 2002).
58
Richard Bing and Magdalena, Why Do Cyclo-Oxygenase-2 Inhibitors Cause Cardiovascular Events?, J Am Coll
Cardiol, Vol. 39 Issue 3, p. 521, 522 (Feb. 6, 2002).
59
Drug Safety; FDA wants power to write warning labels on drugs, CARDIOVASCULAR DEVICE LIABILITY WEEK
(March 27, 2005) at 54.
60
Epstein, supra note 20.
61
Lars, supra note 5.
62
Federal Drug Administration, COX
- 2 Selective (includes Bextra, Celebrex, and Vioxx) and Non-Selective NonSteroidal Anti-Inflammatory Drugs (NSAIDs), available at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/COX2/default.htm (last visited Dec. 12, 2005).
63
Gregory Curfman, et. al., Expression of Concern: Bombardier et al., “Comparison of Upper Gastrointestinal
Toxicity of Rofecoxib and Naproxen in Patients with Rheumatoid Arthritis,” N Engl J Med 2000;343:1520-8.
NEJM (2005) Issue 353, 26.
64
Id.
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deposition, discovered a disk in an envelope submitted with the original article. 65 Using a
tracing feature in the data entry program, Stephen Morrissey, the journal’s managing editor
found that the disk contained another version of the study results.66 This additional data has been
explained by the original authors as data which was collected outside of the timeframe of the
study design. Even though the non-reported data was not taken during the study timeframe, the
authors of the study were seen as misleading the scientific community because they knew that
there was additional data which conflicted with their study’s results.

SUBSEQUENT LITIGATION
Following Vioxx’s withdrawal, an onslaught of lawsuits were filed against Merck. To
date over 6,500 lawsuits have been filed and the number is growing rapidly.67 Federal courts
have assigned these cases to Multi-District- Litigation68. Two widely publicized trials in State
court have already been completed; Ernst v. Merck in Brazoria County, Texas, and Humeston v.
Merck in Atlantic County Superior Court, New Jersey.

Analysts have estimated Merck’s

potential liability exposure somewhere between four and thirty billion dollars.69
Robert Ernst, a 57 year-old marathon runner and Wal-Mart employee, died suddenly after
taking Vioxx for eight months to ease pain in his hands.70 The medical examiner put in her
autopsy report thatEarnst died of an arrhythmia; 71 however, at trial, she stated the cause of death

65

Id.
Mathews, supra note 40.
67
David Brown, Journal Questions Data in Vioxx Study: 3 Heart Attacks Not Mentioned, WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 2005,
at A2.
68
The shareholder cases have been designated in New Jersey as MDL 1658 – In re Merck & Co., Inc., Securities,
Derivative & “ERISA” Litigation; the product liability lawsuits have been designated MDL 1657 – In re VIOXX
Product Liability Litigation.
69
Associated Press, Newbury woman files Vioxx lawsuit, THE UNION LEADER (Manchester, NH) March 24, 2005, at
B3.
70
Nora L. Tooher, Vioxx Goes On Trial, LAWYERS WEEKLY, 2005 LWUSA 437, 460, Aug. 1, 2005 at 1, 24.
71
Arrhythmias are disorders of the heart’s regular rhythmic beating.
66
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was a heart attack. There is no medical or scientific evidence indicating that taking Vioxx is
associated with arrhythmias. In addition, the court allowed experts to testify from merely their
own expertise and admitted the evidence on adverse CV events for 18 month use, while the
plaintiff had only used the drug for eight.72 Despite the lack of evidence, on Aug 19, 2005, the
jury delivered a $253.5 million dollar verdict against Merck in a 10-2 decision.73. Texas law
limits the amount of punitive damages that are recoverable to two million dollars.74 After caps
on respective damages the total award will be reduced to $26 million.75 Following the verdict,
interviews with the jurors revealed that the jurors apparently did not heavily weigh the evidence;
they focused more on sending a message to drug companies regarding their deceptive acts.76
Following the Texas trial Merck released a statement on August 20, 2005, which argued
the verdict was not based on reliable science and that Merck continues to act in the best interests
of their patients.77 The statement also made clear that Merck plans to continue its strategy of
vigorously defending individual Vioxx lawsuits.78
Fortunately for Merck, the jury sided 8-1 with the company in the second publicized state
court trial in Atlantic City Superior Court of New Jersey. 79 In that case, Mike Humeston
suffered a heart attack after taking 25mg of Vioxx for pain in his knee from an injury he had
received during his U.S. Marine service.80 Because the cause of death was not in dispute, this
case was arguably more indicative of a sample of the lawsuits filed. However, since Mr.
72

Tooher, supra note 68.
Id.
74
Heather Win Tesoriero, et al., Merck Loss Jolts Drug Giant, Industry, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 2005, at A1.
75
Id.
76
Kristen Hayes, Vioxx Jurors Sought to Send a Message, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 19, 2005), available at
http://www.abcnews.go.com/US/LegalCenter/wireStory?id=1053407.
77
Associated Press, Merck Wins New Jersey VIOXX® Product Case (Nov. 3, 2005), available at
http://www.vioxx.com/rofecoxib/vioxx/consumer/index.jsp.
78
Barbara Martinez, Facing Vioxx Trials, Merck Pledges To Fight Each Case, WALL ST. J., April 22, 2005, at A1.
79
Lisa Brennen, Merck Wins Big in New Jersey Vioxx Trial (Nov. 4, 2005), available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1131012312488.
80
Associated Press, Major Victory for Merck in N.J. Trial (Nov. 3, 2005), available at
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/9910674.
73
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Humeston had taken Vioxx for less than three months, it was difficult to relate any of the
negative studies which have all been trials of at least nine months or longer.81 There has not
been any negative short-term data collected, likely because the human body is very resilient to
short-term, low-level toxicity.

CLINICAL RESEARCH
The research results have received different interpretations throughout both the medical
and pharmaceutical field. One interpretation of the epidemiological data suggests a relationship
between Vioxx and patients suffering adverse CV events. Others cite that the data is inaccurate
because the CV results were not collected as part of the study’s intended design. All CV data
collected comes from secondary findings 82 from studies designed for a different purpose.
However, plaintiffs will attempt to use these findings in order to imply that Merck had
knowledge of an increased risk of adverse CV outcomes. The use of these studies as admissible
evidence will center on the reliability of the data, the intended design timeframe, and how long
the patient took Vioxx.
ORIGINAL DATABASE
The original FDA safety database on Vioxx included approximately 5000 patients and
did not show an increased risk of heart attack or stroke.83 The reliability of studies for examining
gastrointestinal (“GI”) adverse effects was generally limited. Many studies were inadequately
powered to detect differences in frequency of separate adverse GI events.

81

Most studies

Id.
A secondary finding is additional data collected during a study’s intended timeframe regarding a category or class
that was not part of the specific study design, but was collected contemporaneously with the clinical trial period.
83
FDA, Vioxx Questions and Answers (created Sept. 30, 2004), available at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/vioxx/vioxxQA.htm. (last visited Feb 10, 2006). See also, Epstein, supra
note 20.
82
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examined short term effect, which suggested that COX-II inhibitors are associated with a slightly
lower risk of GI toxicity compared with NSAIDs.84
VIGOR
In March 2000, Merck funded a GI safety study entitled “Vioxx Gastrointestinal
Outcomes Research” (“VIGOR”).85 The VIGOR trial was a double blind, randomized, stratified,
parallel group trial of 8076 patients designed to compare the occurrence of GI toxicity with
Vioxx 25mg and 50mg per day or naproxen86 1000mg per day during long term treatment for
patients with rheumatoid arthritis. Aspirin use was not permitted in the study. As a secondary
finding, patients taking Vioxx had an overall increase in adverse CV events throughout the 18
month study compared to placebo. The study initially published in the New England Journal of
Medicine showed Vioxx has a 4.25 times the relative risk of heart attack compared to naproxen.
(Vioxx 17/2315 = 0.0073 vs. Naproxen 4/2316 = 0.0017).87 This study was submitted to the
FDA. 88 The additional data recently uncovered shows additional heart attacks which would
increase the relative risk of Vioxx to five times that of patients taking naproxen (Vioxx 20/2698
= 0.0074 vs. Naproxen 4/2699 = 0.00148).89 None of the adverse CV events in the study were
fatal.90 In May 2000, after VIGOR publication, Merck’s top research and marketing executives
declined to perform a more extensive study focused on Vioxx’s CV risks, arguing that the
VIGOR data was unreliable.91

84

Corinne de Vires, supra note 35.
Mukherjee, supra note 44.
86
Naproxen is commonly known by trade name as Aleve.
87
Claire Bombardier, et. al., Comparison of Upper Gastrointestinal Toxisity of Rofecoxib and Naproxen in Patients
with Rheumatoid Arthritis, NEJM (2000), Issue 343, 1520-1528.
88
Id. This data is depicted in tables on page 46.
89
Curfman, supra note 63.
90
Id.
91
Epstein, supra note 20.
85
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APPROVe
Subsequently, Merck undertook a different large, randomized trial of 2,586 patients in an
attempt to expand the permissible uses of the drug approved to include treatment of colon
polyps.92 The study, termed APPROVe, revealed that 3.6% of subjects taking Vioxx had adverse
CV events compared to 2.0% in the placebo group.93 This data prompted Merck to voluntarily
remove the drug from the market. 94 Removal of the drug also came from pressure of FDA
scientists, such as David Graham, who interpreted the study to say Vioxx had caused between
88,000 and 139,000 heart attacks. Out of that number, he suggested that 40% of those were
fatal.95
CLASS
Pfizer Inc. performed a six-month study comparing the cardiovascular effects of its drug
Celebrex to Vioxx.96 The study was called CLASS (Celecoxib Arthritis Safety Study).97 The
study found a decrease in GI complications by 10-20 per 1000, but an increase in adverse CV
events by 3 per 1000.98 In percentages, Vioxx decreased GI bleeding by 1-2% while increasing
CV events by approximately 0.3% when compared to placebo. 99 Patients showed a greater
increase in hypertension rates100 with Vioxx than Celebrex when compared to placebo.101 The

92

A polyp is a small growth of tissue shaped like the head or stalk of a mushroom. Two types of polyps developed
in the wall of the colon. They are either hyperplastic (harmless) or adenomatous (precursor to cancer); see also,
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placebo control data camelar gely from patient populations with substantial CV risk, which is
why most were not given the COX-II’s in the first place.102
OTHER STUDIES
Other research revealed discrete clinical differences between the two COX-II inhibitors
which suggest that the effect of the drugs on the cardiovascular system should be viewed
separately rather than as a single class of drugs.103 Subsequent studies have also revealed a
deficiency in what was originally believed to be one of the greatest benefits of the COX-II
inhibitors. Scientists believed COX-II drugs were associated with a reduction in GI bleeding;
however, that reduction may have been grossly exaggerated. 104

A British study of two

randomized controlled trials which followed patients for a year or more found that there was no
significant difference in frequency of perforation, ulceration or bleeding between NSAIDs and
the COX-II inhibitors rofecoxib or etodolac.105

PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW
The law of product liability has developed in tort through Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc.106 Strict liability was assigned to a manufacturer of a defective product on the
market even though both privity of contract and notice of breach of warranty were lacking.107
Strict liability does not rest on a consensual foundation, but on one created by law.

In

Greenman, the court held that no notice was needed for a breach of express warranty regarding
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representations made in a brochure. 108 Thus, strict liability in tort for products was born
judicially as a policy for the economic and social needs for consumer protection. This policy
also alleviated some of the limitations in the negligence and warranty remedies.
Subsequently, the Greenman strict liability principle was incorporated in §402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts which has been adopted in the majority of jurisdictions. Federal
courts will apply state law to the claims because these claims fall under diversity jurisdiction.
The publication of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, drafters have been working on the Third
edition. In 1998, a draft version of the Restatement (Third) of Torts was released which focuses
on product liability in much greater detail, but its provisions are not yet officially enacted into
state legislation. Even though no state has adopted the specific provisions of the third edition,
the courts use it as a guide to interpret existing law.
To establish a successful claim under §402A the plaintiff must establish, (1) the product
had a defect, (2) the product was defective when it left the hands of defendant, and (3) that the
product defect proximately caused the plaintiff’s harm.109 A product may be defective because
of a defect in manufacture, design, or a failure to adequately warn the consumer of a hazard
involved in the foreseeable use of the product.110
A defective condition is one not contemplated by the ultimate consumer which would be
unreasonably dangerous to him.

111

A defective product is one that is “unreasonably

dangerous.” 112 This means it must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be
contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common
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to the community as to its characteristics.113 For example, sugar would not be not be considered
unreasonably dangerous to a diabetic.
A defect in the manufacture of a product exists if the product differs from the
manufacturer's intended design.114 The harmful incident a plaintiff suffers must be of a kind that
ordinarily occurs as a result of a product defect.115 Common examples of manufacturing defects
are products that are physically flawed, damaged, or incorrectly assembled. The Vioxx litigation
does not concern a “bad batch” or contaminated product associated with a manufacturing type of
defect. Here, claims for product defect include defective design and defective warning.
The essential elements of a claim based upon an alleged design defect are: the defendant
was the manufacturer or supplier of a product; the product was defective in design; the defect in
design existed when it left the defendant's possession; the defect in design was a cause of injury
to the plaintiff; and the plaintiff's injury resulted from a use of the product that was reasonably
foreseeable by the defendant. 116 Different jurisdictions, and even inconsistencies within a
jurisdiction, use two common tests to determine whether a product is defective in design.
A product has a defective warning if the use of the product in a manner that is reasonably
foreseeable by the seller involves a substantial danger that would not be readily recognized by
the ordinary user of the product and the manufacturer knows or should have known of the
danger, but fails to give any or adequate warning of such danger. 117 The duty to provide
adequate warning to the user extends to those risks which are known or knowable in light of the
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generally recognized and prevailing best scientific and medical knowledge at the time of
manufacture and distribution.118
Specific attention is directed toward prescription drugs in products liability law.
Restatement (Second) of Torts §402A, comment k (“comment k”) takes special notice of
unavoidably unsafe products and recognizes that because of the high social utility, some products
are incapable of being made safe for intended and ordinary use.119
A manufacturer may also be liable in tort under other theories of recovery. Those related
to the Vioxx litigation include misrepresentation or fraud, and breach of express or implied
warranty. We will now explore each of these theories, their strengths and weaknesses, as applied
to the Vioxx litigation.
There is no question that Vioxx is a product.120 In addition, there is no dispute as to
whether Merck is in the business of selling or otherwise distributing. And since Merck is the
sole manufacturer of Vioxx, we will assume that the consumers were actually given the drug
distributed by the sole manufacturer. There is no question Merck manufactured, designed,
packaged, marketed, sold or distributed Vioxx. There will also be an assumption each user took
their medication as directed by their prescribing physician.
118
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ADMISSIBILITY OF CLINICAL RESEARCH
Merck consistently argues that the studies are unreliable due to their design. Reliability
is a relative term. Something can be highly reliable or it may only be vaguely reliable. What are
the factors that show us whether it is reliable enough to give to the jury?
This revisits one of the greatest disconnects between law and medicine. Just as you
would not want your medical malpractice attorney practicing medicine on you, most Judges are
not medically literate enough to understand the reliability of these scientific studies. This is the
same reason physicians argue for medical courts overseen by a panel of physicians similar to
specialized courts in other areas such as bankruptcy.121
If it is so difficult to understand whether the research is reliable, one suggestion is to let
the jury decide. However, having unsophisticated juries decide whether the data is reliable,
which experts on both sides contradict, does not alleviate any problems and effectively allows
plaintiffs to play the courtroom lottery. In the cases already tried to verdict, allowing for the
introduction of this evidence has only produced what could be expected, inconsistent results that
do not properly instruct the market on how to act or the company to insure against. This has
been a result of differing rules and interpretations in diverse jurisdiction. Some state courts
differently interpret or do not apply the principles laid out in the Daubert Trilogy, which is
followed in a majority of jurisdictions.122
All clinical data that parties wish to introduce will undergo a Daubert hearing on
admissibility as the court operates in its “gate-keeping” function. 123 The admissibility of
evidence will likely have different outcomes that varies depending on where a case was filed.
121
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The state and federal rules of evidence often differ drastically. 124 An expert may rely on
information that is not itself admissible.125 It would not seem difficult then to be able to find
experts willing to use some or all of the studies, in addition to their own medical experience126 to
formulate an opinion that Vioxx caused patients taking it to have a heart attack or stroke.
Under the older Frye test,127 evidence of scientific theory or technique is inadmissible
unless it has gained the general acceptance in the community or the particular field to which it
belongs. Under the current Daubert standard, the trial court judge needs to make sure that
scientific testimony or other specialized knowledge is relevant and reliable. 128 In order to
determine reliability of the evidence the judge may consider: whether the theory can and has
been tested; whether it has been subject to peer review; whether the theory or methodology
employed is generally accepted in the relevant scientific community; and the known or expected
rate of error.129
The difficulty with the Vioxx data is the expected rates of error of secondary findings and
the acceptance of those in the scientific community. The gold standard 130 in the scientific
community for a reliable epidemiological study is a double blind placebo controlled study
designed to study a certain effect. The research showing increased CV would also have to
correlate to the milligrams taken by the patient. If the study used patients taking Vioxx at 50mg
and the injured patient only used Vioxx at 25mg, the correlation between the two would not be
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scientifically reliable. The VIGOR study followed patients for 18 months so it would not be on
point for those who took Vioxx for a lesser time period.
Further, Merck argued that Vioxx itself did not cause the heart attacks but that Naproxen
was somehow preventing them, which makes the two products dissimilar comparisons in headto-head trials. 131 The CLASS study was the only one designed to study CV events. In the
publication of the CLASS findings comparing CV effects of Vioxx to Celebrex, the author
disclaims the reliability of the data comparing Vioxx to placebo because it is a secondary
finding. 132 The other research also discovered CV risk only through secondary findings.
Plaintiffs have also pointed to a study conducted in 1998 that had secondary results indicating
Vioxx caused heart problems in dogs, but this may not show a similar reaction in humans.
It appears that each piece of evidence individually should not pass Daubert standards.
However, judges may decide after reviewing the studies that collectively they are reliable enough
to be admissible.

THE COX-II DESIGN
For most products, there are two common assessments to determine if a product is
defective in design. Under the first test, called the Consumer-Expectation-Test, a product is
defective in design if it fails to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when
used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner. 133 This is the impression reasonably
received by a consumer through representations or other communications made to him about the
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product through various means such as: advertising, appearance of product, or other ways in
which product projects an image on the mind of the consumer, including impressions created by
widespread social agreement about the products function.134
It is quite easy to satisfy this test because often this is the sole purpose of filing the
litigation in the first place. Here, users would argue that after taking the appropriately prescribed
amount to cure their pain they suffered a heart attack. No ordinary person would expect to have
a heart attack as a result from taking their pain medication. However, ordinary patients do
expect drugs to have at least some side effects.
The second and most prominent test is the Risk-Utility-Test which determines if there is a
risk of danger inherent in the design which outweighs the benefits of that design. 135 When
making this determination, the trier of fact considers: the gravity of the danger posed by the
design; the frequency of harm; the likelihood that such danger would cause damage, the
mechanical feasibility of a safer alternate design at the time of manufacture, the financial cost of
an improved design, and the adverse consequences to the product and the consumer that would
result from an alternate design.136
Here, the danger of heart attack or stroke is extremely grave, but according to the studies
the frequency of these events is only marginally increased compared to naproxen (0.17% to
0.73%).137 The likelihood is different depending on how high a CV risk the patient had to begin
with. The only properly designed CV effect study only compared the drug to Celebrex. This
may indicate the feasibility of a safer design, but no one understands how or why. Different
people weighing these factors may place different emphasis on what they believe to be important
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factors. It appears relatively clear that medical science hasn’t evolved enough to understand just
how the COX enzymes work. It would be difficult to argue with any medical certainty since
scientists do not understand exactly how Celebrex and Vioxx differ from each other besides their
chemical structures. Because of this ambiguity, it would seem for now that after weighing the
factors under this test, the purported benefits of the drug outweigh the risk; thus, no design
defect.
However, neither traditional risk verses benefit nor consumer expectation analyses apply
in the majority of jurisdictions for prescription drugs.138 The majority of jurisdictions follow the
holding in Brown v. Superior Court, whereby pharmaceutical drugs are automatically analyzed
using comment k. 139

There is no requirement that the drug be determined unavoidably

dangerous in order to be measured by comment k.140 The test provides that when a drug does not
provide any net benefits to any class of patients or when reasonable, informed health-care
providers would not prescribe it to any class of patients, then the design of the product is
defective and the manufacturer should be subject to liability for harm caused.141 The issue is
whether, objectively viewed, reasonable providers, knowing the foreseeable risks and benefits of
the drug, would prescribe it for any class of patient.142 The majority follow this test because the
foreseeability of risk of harm is more complex in the case of prescription drugs.143
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Prescription drugs are necessary to alleviate pain and suffering or to sustain life. They
are distinct from other products, such as construction machinery, which are used to make work
easier or provide pleasure.144 The delay involved in withholding a drug from the market until
scientific skill and knowledge advanced to the point at which additional dangerous side effects
would be revealed, when added to the delay required for approval from the FDA, would not
serve the public welfare.145
The comment k test is the most difficult test to prove. After Merck removed Vioxx from
the market, patients complained that it was the only drug effective to help them with pain
management. Patients cited that if there was an associated CV risk they had an open willingness
to confront it.146 The drug still provides great benefits to the entire classes taking the drug,
although providing less of a benefit for those with high CV risk. Doctors still prescribed the
drug after the research and editorials were published in medical literature. Also, there is no
research which indicates increased CV risk for short-term use.

However, if Merck

representatives had not downplayed the risk associated with Vioxx, physicians may have not
prescribed the drug because of the wide range of available alternatives. Even assuming Vioxx
was not intended to be prescribed to some classes, the data does not indicate that if Vioxx does
cause heart attacks it would not benefit any class at all.
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DID MERCK PROVIDE ADEQUATE WARNING?
The issue of warning is acute in drug cases because of the extensive federal regulation of
warnings. 147 The majority of courts also follow comment k when determining whether the
manufacturer provided an adequate warning.148 One cited reason is that in the case of new or
experimental drugs there can often be no assurance of safety or purity.149 The comment k rule is
that manufacturers are not strictly liable for injuries caused by a prescription drug so long as the
drug was properly prepared and accompanied by warnings of its dangerous propensities that
were either known or reasonably scientifically knowledgeable at the time of distribution.150 If a
manufacturer satisfies those elements the product is considered not defective or unreasonably
dangerous.151 The burden is on the plaintiff to prove by preponderance that adequate warnings
were not provided.152 The adequacy and sufficiency of the manufacturers warning is determined
under the objective reasonableness standard. 153 The question becomes would a reasonable
person in the same or similar circumstances have been adequately warned.
Putting a warning on a product may increase the manufacturer’s exposure to liability
because the manufacturer may not then say it did not owe the consumer a duty to warn.154 By
not placing a warning on a product, the issue becomes a question of fact for jury of whether
Merck owed a duty to the consumer. However since all prescription drugs require warnings,
Merck may not follow this logic.155
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LEARNED INTERMEDIARIES
A manufacturer may be excused from warning each user if it properly warns the
prescribing physician of the medication’s dangers.156 In this case, Merck engaged in direct-toconsumer marketing which may also require the company to adequately directly warn consumers.
The Restatement (Third) of Torts has left this issue to developing case law, depending on
whether a state’s products liability law legislates the boundaries of the learned intermediary
doctrine. 157 One court has determined that factors to consider include the amount spent on
advertising and how aggressive the company was in advertising to the public.158 Other courts
have held that if the advertisements inform patients to consult with a physician, then the doctrine
applies.159
For the majority, comment k limits the duty of drug manufacturers to only provide
adequate warnings to learned intermediaries.160 Strict liability applies when prescription drug
manufacturers fail to adequately warn physicians of the dangers associated with its product.161
Under normal circumstances, prescribing health care providers are in the best position to reduce
risks of harm to a patient in accordance with instructions or warnings.162 Those professionals
know what type of patient they are giving the prescription to, what types of risks that person
carries, what other medicines they are taking, what other ailments they have, and minimally
assess the level of sophistication of the patient’s capability to use the product correctly.
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The learned intermediary doctrine does not necessarily bar all failure to warn claims
against drug manufacturers. It does not shield drug manufacturers from liability if the warnings
they provided to physicians do not permit the physicians to adequately advise their patients.163
Pharmaceutical companies and their representatives must reasonably instruct doctors of
the dangers of their product. “Dear Doctor” letters, which warn doctors of newly discovered risks
or side effects of a product, have been held to be an inadequate way to appropriately warn.164
Merck issued one of these letters in April 2002 informing doctors of the marketing and labeling
changed to address the VIGOR study.165
What Merck arguably failed to do was adequately represent the findings of the study to
physicians. This applies to the case of an injured patient relying on the warnings conveyed to
him through his doctor about Vioxx. Patients often visit a doctor’s office, request medication,
and must completely rely on the physician’s statements. The learned intermediary doctrine does
not preclude the plaintiffs from seeking damages, because Merck sales representatives made
representations regarding the safety and efficacy of its product which were not true. According
to the FDA warning letter, Merck’s representatives allegedly were not appropriately warning
physicians about the seriousness of the CV risk. However, if the data was unreliable as Merck
believed and still believes it to be, then they did not fail to warn the doctors.

STATE OF THE ART KNOWLEDGE
A product manufacturer is not strictly liable for failure to warn of dangers that the
manufacturer neither knew nor could have known given the state of the art knowledge at the time
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the product was manufactured.166 The manufacturer’s duty is confined to a situation in which the
seller has knowledge or should have known of the danger.167 Therefore, a manufacturer has no
duty to warn of unknown risks. Termed the “state of the art defense,” it is not an affirmative
defense because it relates to one of the fundamental elements of the claim. The court in Brown
and the Restatement (Third) of Torts have adopted Professor Wade’s view that a manufacturer’s
actual or constructive knowledge should be measured from the time the drug is distributed.168
However, there is still a small minority of jurisdictions that reject this view and measure actual
or constructive knowledge known at the time of trial.169 When courts follow the later approach,
an unavoidable risk on manufacturers is created because one cannot insure against an
unknowable risk.
Once evidence is introduced by plaintiffs that the defendant knew or should have know of
the danger, then the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that information was not reasonably
obtainable or available and that the defendant lacked constructive knowledge. Constructive
knowledge is knowledge which is obtainable by the application of reasonable, developed human
skill and foresight. 170 The burden on the defendant is a matter of policy since it was the
defendant who released the product into the stream of commerce.
Many courts find that if a risk is beginning to be known and there is a difference in
opinion, but the manufacturer reasonably decides not to warn consumers and harm still occurs,

166

§402A, supra note 102, at comment j. A manufacturer’s duty is continued to warn to a situation in which the
seller has knowledge or by the application of reasonable, developed human skill and foresight should have
knowledge of the danger.
167
Id.
168
Brown, supra note 138, citing Wade, The Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable Prior to
Marketing, 58 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 734, 753, 754 (1983); see also, §2, supra note 143, at comment i. The basic duty to
warn is measured from the time of sale. A manufacturer must warn users when feasible and reasonably necessary.
169
Brown, supra note 138.
170
Bashesda v. Johns-Mansville Products, 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982). The defendant must have actual or
constructive knowledge of the harm.

30

then the product is unreasonably dangerous.171 This is because knowable harm can be avoided
through reasonable diligence in discovering the risk.
anything became knowable or even if it ever has.

For Vioxx, it is questionable when
Because the results of the studies are

secondary findings, a question arises as to whether pharmaceutical companies must research
every potentially harmful yet unreliable finding that is produced. The answer is of course not;
however, the data’s reliability increases when it continues to yield the same results.
One reason Merck did not perform additional studies specifically designed toward CV
safety is that conducting an additional or specific study indicates that the manufacturer believes
there is a problem with their product.172 The company argues that it did test for CV safety before
the drug went to market.173 If the results were detrimental they would surely be used against
them. Physicians and patients would not widely use a product that is under review by the
manufacturer for causing heart attacks and strokes. It was financially not in their best interest.
This reason is in addition to the obvious one that if a risk did exist it would not be in the
shareholder’s interest to find out. Plaintiffs will say that Merck continued to deny the ill health
effects associated with Vioxx while at the same time reaping profits obtained through nondisclosure and concealment.
In addition to the duty to warn at the time of sale, many states require manufacturers to
fulfill a post-sale duty to warn of dangers when they become aware of new risks and should
reasonably warn the users.174 As may happen with any new drug product, serious side effects
associated with analgesics may become evident only after approval and widespread use. Even
though Merck may not have known or have been able to know of CV risks at the drug’s
171
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inception, the company must warn users if they subsequently find out or should have found out
patients are suffering heart attacks from use of Vioxx. Merck has warned post sale. After
receiving the FDA warning letter in 2002, Merck changed Vioxx’s labeling to include findings
of the VIGOR study results as well as precautions against hypertension and those patients with
CV risk.175
At some point between the drug’s inception at Merck’s labs and when the product was
removed, the company believed the concern was great enough to remove the drug from market.
It would obviously take a large concern to remove a drug which generated $2.3 billion a year
from the market. Plaintiffs will try to use this to impeach Merck’s credibility and play to juror’s
emotions by stating that the publicly-traded corporation has loyalty only to its shareholders.
They can argue that Merck ignored the possible increased CV risk and continuing to market its
product only to later find subsequent studies only supported the conclusion that the risk exists.
Merck will argue that at no point has there been enough reliable data showing increased CV risk.
As Merck saw it, the weight of the imperfect studies eventually shifted the weight of the
unreliable studies to give an indication that the reoccurrence of the secondary results were not
merely random chance.
Merck representatives argued that the VIGOR study showing increased heart attack and
stroke risk was flawed because the data was a secondary finding of a study directed for another
purpose. If this is true, then why did Merck voluntary remove the product from the market after
their own study indicated the increase risk also as a secondary finding? Why was Merck’s study
reliable enough to take Vioxx off the market and others were not?
One idea is that Merck decided that their own study made the weight of all available data
reach a evidentiary threshold that they should be aware that there may be a CV problem. It
175
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would not matter that Merck’s own study was not a study designed for CV effects, merely that
the weight of several imperfect studies have reached a level to indicate a probable outcome.
Also, Merck’s study was conducted with a large population which also increased the reliability
of any secondary finding. Again the issue rests on the reliability and admissibility of these
studies, which is later discussed in further detail.
HEEDING PRESUMPTION
In order for an injured party to recover, the patient would have had to read and followed
any additional warning. Assuming the warning was inadequate, discerning whether someone
would have still taken Vioxx if given the proper warning is difficult to do. This is especially true
if the patient died as a result of taking the medication. It is not appropriate to view this
retrospectively because it is obvious that if the patient knew they were going to die they never
would have taken the drug.

The Restatement (Second) of Torts takes this quandary into

consideration and presumes that the consumer heeded the warning.176 Evidence may be offered
to rebut such testimony, which is often done at trial.
This is effectively accomplished by impeaching someone for smoking despite strong
labeling or taking other prescriptions with similar or more significant risks. Also, the warning
was changed in 2002 to incorporate the concerns of the VIGOR study. If the claimant took the
drug after 2002 and read the warning, then they would have already taken the drug with some
warning of CV risks even if the VIGOR data was underrepresented. If the patient never read the
product insert, then it shows the probability of them heeding the warning is highly unlikely.

176

§402A, supra note 109, at comment j.

33

EXPRESS WARRANTY
Breach of express warranty occurs when products fail to conform to a promise made by a
seller to the buyer regarding statements (oral or written) at or before time of sale. 177 The
statements may be packaged with the goods at time of sale or even directed to the public at
large.178 The representation from the seller must become some basis of the bargain; in other
words, the buyer must rely upon the seller’s statements.179
The proposed amendments to the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) specifically attend
to information provided in packaging and advertising, holding those responsible for such
statements to conform to the affirmations of fact within.180
After 2002, the Vioxx package insert warned of CV risks.181 If the product was taken
between 1999 and 2002, then there may be some type of implication that the drug is safe.
However, because there were no affirmative representations, it does not amount to a promise.
Any statements given during Merck’s multi-million dollar a year advertising campaign likely did
not warn of CV effects. Again, as long as the there were not any affirmative statements in the
ads regarding CV risk then they are not express warranties.
It appears from the FDA warning letter directed to Merck that their sales representatives
were making express warranties about the product that were not true. Those representatives
during presentations not only downplayed VIGOR results, they also stated the drug was safe for
other uses which were not FDA approved and the CV safety of the drug was perfectly fine.
177
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Although medical professionals had access to the same studies published in the journals, it is not
the standard of care for them to be current with nonstandard practices.
From the known facts, Merck’s representatives did not make any express warranty that
adverse CV events would never result from use of Vioxx. Any representation that the drug was
CV safe is still correct because if adverse CV events do occur it effects such a small percent of
the population.

IMPLIED WARRANTY
There is a general societal assumption that a product is safe and effective when it is put
on the market. Vioxx was approved for the earlier stated uses and is assumed fit for those
purposes. A product must be reasonably fit for the ordinary purposes for which it is used.182
The advertisements to the public and promotion to physicians were an implicit indication
that the drug was safe and effective for its intended uses. In this case, one would expect when
ingesting Vioxx that it would be effective in relieving pain; a drug that caused patients to have
heart attacks would not be fit for much of anything. However, comment k specifically addresses
this issue in prescription drug cases stating that adverse reactions are unavoidable in prescription
drugs. 183

Not everyone that took Vioxx suffered an adverse CV event; only 0.73% of

participants using Vioxx did during the VIGOR study. Since adverse CV events occur in such a
small minority of users it would seem that Vioxx would not be unfit for its intended purpose.
Another implied warranty may be made regarding the heavy marketing of COX-II
inhibitors as reducing stomach bleeding. Some of the new studies show that this is not true, and
if any GI benefit is associated it is marginal at best. This may have induced some patients with

182
183

Uniform Commercial Code §2-314(2)(c).
§402A, supra note 109 at comment k.

35

higher risk for GI bleeding to use this medication when the risk of traditional NSAIDs was too
great. This would only concern those plaintiffs who suffered GI injury. They would not have to
prove they would not have had a GI injury from another NSAID because they likely would not
have taken any COX drug at all because of their risk. It would not matter when or if Merck
knew that the drug did not provide this benefit. It merely matters that the drug did not conform
to the implied representation. However, there is no reliable information to this effect and both
the original and updated package insert expressly warns of an associated GI risk.

MISREPRESENTATION
Returning to the FDA warning letter, Merck should not have been as careless in
downplaying the CV dangers of Vioxx. The sales representatives allegedly continued to market
Vioxx by downplaying the risk. Misrepresentation184 occurs when the seller makes a fraudulent,
negligent, or innocent misrepresentation of material fact concerning the character or quality of its
product which caused justifiable reliance and someone is physically harmed as a result of that
misrepresentation. 185 Those responsible are strictly liable in tort without proving any actual
defect in the product.186 Did Merck know or should it have known otherwise when making their
statements?
According to the FDA warning letter, Merck sales representatives misinformed
physicians about the proven abilities of the drug in addition to downplaying any CV risk. The
letter stated, “Additionally, your claim in the press release that Vioxx has a ‘favorable
cardiovascular safety profile,’ is simply incomprehensible, given the rate of MI and serious CV
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events compared to naproxen.”187 If such allegations are true, physicians were likely induced to
prescribe Vioxx to patients. The patients then justifiably relied on the advice of their prescribing
physician to take the medication. However, the statements Merck’s sales representatives must
actually be false or substantially misleading. Merck would only be able to make representations
on the safety of their product if they had reliable data which did not show an increase in CV
events, but Merck argues that they did test CV safety prior to the drug’s approval.188
The scientists clearly knew data was omitted when submitted to the FDA. Merck will
argue it is not a misrepresentation. The study was not designed or promoted to show CV effects.
In addition the data left out was given to editors after they wrote the article, but before it was
submitted to the FDA. The additional data was taken outside the timeframe of the study design.
Scientists often continue to collect data for additional months so that it may show a reason to
design a study for a longer length. Since the patients that are studied do not all start and stop on
the same date, researchers are often still studying a patient past the studies timeframe while
others have not yet finished. This is where the extra data has come from.
The FDA warning letter issued to Merck informed them that their sales representatives
were bolstering the ability and effectiveness of Vioxx for unapproved uses and downplaying the
drug’s associated risks. If sales representatives were affirmatively representing that the drug was
perfectly cardiovascularly safe, the representatives would not have exercised reasonable care in
the accuracy of any data they gave. There is no reliable data either way. Just because there is no
reliable data saying Vioxx causes heart attacks does not mean company representatives can
misrepresent that the drug does not without evidence.
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justifiable reliance because the data only changed the CV risk from 4.25 to five times placebo.189
This only showed a slightly greater statistical, but no true clinical, difference. The data on the
disk merely will be usable for Merck’s credibility, makingthe company appear to be covering up
other data because they did not show the three additional CV events in the additional 383 persons
studied outside of the study’s timeframe. Any argument that when Merck’s scientists made
additional public statements and published articles that it believed its product was safe and that
the data showing otherwise was a misrepresentation is incorrect.

CAUSATION
Another fundamental element to a successful products liability claim is causation. The
damages must be a proximate result from a defect or failure to warn. Causation is the causal
connection between a defective product and the user’s harm.190 Causation in fact occurs when
but for the defect or failure to give adequate warning the harm would not have occurred.191 The
defect must also be the producing cause of the harm which is the extent that public policy allows
liability to extend.192 In analyzing one must find that the product could actually cause this type
of injury; and if so, whether the product caused that type of harm in this situation. It is often
necessary for an injured party to produce expert testimony to prove the specific cause of the
injuries.
In the case of Vioxx, a plaintiff must show a casual nexus between taking Vioxx and the
adverse CV event the plaintiff suffered. Epidemiological studies, case reports of injuries, animal
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studies, and FDA statements, if admissible, may be used as evidence to this effect.193 One alone
may not satisfy the plaintiff’s burden, but it may be satisfied collectively.194
Because the plaintiffs have the burden of proof for causation, without it Merck will
obtain summary judgment or directed verdict. This element is often easily satisfied where
patients suffer from signature diseases. In those cases it is more obvious why a patient is
suffering from such disease.
Because there are no studies or other evidence linking Vioxx to anaphylactic shock,
summary judgment was granted to Merck in one Ohio case where the plaintiff died from sudden
anaphylactic shock after taking samples of Vioxx.195 The ruling was upheld on the issue that
there was no evidence that the plaintiff’s death was cased by the lack of warnings.196
The problem with these Vioxx cases is different; here, the injury that is produced, adverse
CV events, are normally occurring phenomena. With the current science, we are medically
incapable of making an exact determination whether a CV event was caused by Vioxx or another
contributing factor(s).

So while there may arguably be an increase in occurrence, a

determination as to which CV events were natural and which were due to Vioxx are beyond
medical science. There is no medically discoverable difference between someone who dies of a
Vioxx heart attack or stroke and someone who dies from one due to other causes.
Additionally, the epidemiological studies indicate the injury only affects a small
percentage or fractional percentage of the users. Merck’s experts will point to plaintiff’s medical
records and any indication of other factors which may have contributed to an adverse CV event.
There are dozens of contributing factors to one suffering an adverse CV event; stress in a
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patient’s work and family life or whether they drink coffee or other caffeinated beverages could
have contributed to heart problems.
Expert testimony does not meet the plaintiff’s burden by merely stating problem X causes
Y effect. In order for there to be sufficient causation evidence they must say Y effect here
occurred as a result of X problem. The plaintiff’s expert will have difficulties ruling out other
possibilities on cross-examination, but if proper testimony was elicited then the issue will go to
jury.
The adverse CV effect alleged in Vioxx litigation appears strikingly similar to the
ephedra litigation. In those cases, plaintiffs alleged that ephedra caused increased heart attacks
and strokes.197 However, there was no scientific evidence as to what caused any individual heart
attack. The only evidence was that overall there is an increased incidence of these CV events.198
The most noteworthy irregularity between Vioxx trials will be whether the jurisdiction
advocates the application of probability theory of proof process.199 Aside from the differences in
conceptual and analytic application, fundamental arguments surround whether courts should use
(1) probabilistic techniques to determine the likelihood of the facts supporting a defendant’s guilt
or liability and (2) whether or not the plaintiff’s burden is satisfied when that probability exceeds
a threshold value. 200 Individual judges also have different interpretations on the relationship
between probability and proof. Each judge carries his or her own personal views on whether
integrating mathematics into the fact-finding process of a legal trial outweigh the benefits.
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Proponents of probabilistic decision-making believe that statistics may be used to meet
the preponderance of the evidence standard employed in civil litigation.201 The standard is the
burden of demonstrating that the likelihood of the defendant’s liability is greater than the
likelihood of his innocence; in other terms the probability supporting the defendant’s liability
exceeds 0.5 or 50%.202 Generally, probability of a given outcome in some activity is calculated
by measuring the frequency with which that outcome occurs.203 Alone, the frequency rate of
injury is insufficient to determine the probability of causation that Vioxx was more likely than
not to have caused the plaintiff’s heart attack. 204

In order to illustrate this common

misapplication, consider the hypothetical case of a High School baseball game where 1000
people come to view the game.205 If 499 people pay the $3 for a ticket and the other 501 attend
by gate-crashing, then in a legal action against any one spectator according to the 0.501
probability, the action would be successful against any spectator.206
There is continuing theoretical debate on whether to find some defendants liable for those
torts which they did not commit or having individual plaintiffs fail to recover for actual harm.207
The answer is often different depending on the goal or the court in a particular case, i.e. to deter
conduct or allow companies to insure against ascertainable loss. Some theorists even suggest
allowing discounted recoveries to reflect scientific uncertainty.208
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A bare probability should lead the legal system to decline to act by holding for the
defendant.209 In Smith v. Rapid Transit the court held, “merely that mathematically the chances
are in favor of a proposition is not enough to establish it by a preponderance of the evidence;
there must be actual belief from evidence that the proposition is more probably true.” 210 The
scientific data alone is not sufficient for a directed verdict or summary judgment, and no matter
how strong the data is in either direction, it must be submitted to the trier of fact to make the
determination of liability. Harvard Law Professor Laurence Tribe has argued in support of the
actual belief requirement stating, “Moral qualms about imposing civil liability under conditions
of uncertainty should respond to the actual risk of verdict error, not its overtness.”211 “Because
people readily perceive the risk of verdict error, they become uneasy if the legal system relies on
such evidence to change the status quo by holding for the plaintiff.”212
In addition to the flawed nature of the statistical theories, courts are often guilty of
misapplication of statistics.213 The risk ratio, also known as relative risk, may be defined as the
risk of disease in a population segment exposed to a particular substance, divided by the risk of
the disease in the rest of the population.214 The risk ratio represents how much more likely an
exposed person is to contract the disease than an unexposed person.215 A comparison is made
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between the proportion of persons with the disease in a group of people exposed versus the
proportion of persons with the disease in the group not exposed. The risk ratio does not equal or
even approximate the probability of causation.216 There is a clear distinction between the excess
incidence caused by an exposure (attributable fraction) and the probability that the exposure
caused an individual’s disease (the “probability of causation”).217 Many epidemiologists and
health physicists serving as expert consultants and witnesses continue to equate attributable
fractions with the probability of causation.218
In epidemiology, risk is quantitative. Due to generalized error rates from sample size,
study bias, and error due to chance, resulting data simply represents a close approximation of the
actual risk. 219 The subjective probability derived by a legal fact-finder is more accurately
described as an estimate based on a sample of information rather than a true value derived from
an analysis of all possible information.220 Risk ratios less than three can be generated entirely by
factors such as study bias and lack of precision. 221 A large risk ratio signifies a strong
association, which is highly indicative, although not determinative, of a casual relationship.
Some courts have viewed risk ratios greater than one as capable of proving causation.222 In
Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,223 testimony based on an epidemiological study
with a risk ration between 1.3 and 1.8 and other data was found to be sufficient.224 Although any
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risk ration greater than one logically would support the notion of a casual relationship, any risk
ration less than three generally indicates a weak association.225
One oversight with this measurement is the fact that the risk is viewed in statistical
differences; in other words, it fails to address true clinical differences. For example, a scientific
study revealing that there is a clear increase in the number of patients acquiring a particular
disease is attributable to a certain drug, but where the particular disease affects a significant
population of people. Note that the more common the disease, the lower the risk ratio (i.e. the
increase in denominator value). Analogically speaking, five pebbles in an empty bucket looks
much different than adding five to an already half-full bucket even though the increase was the
same.

DEFENSES
Assuming that a plaintiff was able to bring a successful claim against the manufacturer,
those seeking recovery would still have face any affirmative defenses. Comparative fault is a
defense to strict liability. 226 It is negligence on the part of a plaintiff which combining with the
product defect or failure to warn contributes as a cause in bringing about the injury. 227
Comparative fault on the part of plaintiff does not bar recovery by the plaintiff against the
defendant, but the total amount of damages to which plaintiff would otherwise be entitled shall
be reduced by the percentage that plaintiff's comparative fault contributed as a cause to plaintiff's
injury.228

225

Melissa Moore Thompson, Casual Inference in Epidemiology: Implications for Toxic Tort Litigation, 71 N.C.L.
Rev. 247, 251, 252 (1992).
226
Apportionment of Responsibility, Restatement (Third) of Torts §17, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE (1998).
227
Id.
228
Id.

44

The facts in the case of Vioxx assume Merck will not be able to use comparative fault if
its product was properly taken as prescribed. Any other outside medical factors which may have
contributed to the heart attack are relevant to proving causation and not comparative fault. These
are outside factors that do not amount to negligence on the part of the user.

OUTLOOK
It appears that plaintiffs will encounter significant obstacles to their claims. There are no
solid portions to any part of the claims. The largest hurdle to any claim is the reliability of the
scientific studies and expert testimony. Again, that will largely depend on what jurisdiction or
whether the case is in federal or state court. The issue of causation here is almost impossible to
prove, but if the plaintiffs survive summary judgment, then statistically if enough cases are tried
some will be successful. For future litigation, plaintiffs in federal court will also confront the
requirement of a unanimous verdict.
These cases appear to be duds, but that is not stopping plaintiffs from attempting to reap
the large judgments of the few winnable cases. If Merck is successful in defending say 90% of
their lawsuits, but they are mostly tried, the company will have to face financial difficulties. The
cost of defending some suits may cost more than settling. The few cases that win will surely be
enough to fuel the well organized plaintiff’s bar to continue in the fight since the likely payouts
would be significant.
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